Wednesday, April 25, 2012

Canada's Head Fake Asia Policy? | The Diplomat

Is Canada doing its own pivot toward the Asia-Pacific? It will need to focus more on Southeast Asia if it is serious about one.

While the United States has made a self-declared “pivot” toward Asia, Canada’s current Asia policy can perhaps best be described as a “head fake.” In basketball terminology, a pivot is a move in a new direction, while one foot remains firmly planted on the floor; this is an apt metaphor for the renewed interest of the U.S. in Asia as at the same time it remains committed to its existing relationships in the Western Hemisphere and Europe. A head fake on the other hand, is an indication of a change in direction, but in fact no change normally takes place. It’s a passing moment, a tactic to draw attention, while the main thrust of movement lies in another direction.

Canada has been “head faking” a lot in Asia recently. Whether this is more than a tactical move remains to be seen. Canada remains highly committed to getting early entry into the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade talks, and has now been able to secure Peruvian and Chilean endorsement, along with support from Malaysia. However, the deal maker or deal breaker for Canadian entry remains the United States, and during the recent meeting in Washington between Prime Minister Stephen Harper and U.S. President Barack Obama, the president was careful to couch his support for Canadian participation in very general terms while repeating the caveats about all participants needing to make changes to meet the standards set for the agreement. New Zealand also remains a key stumbling block. Canadian Trade Minister Ed Fast had a chance to meet with his New Zealand counterpart, Tim Groser, at the G-20 Trade Ministers meeting in Mexico, but Groser and New Zealand have been firm on the need for Canada’s antiquated dairy supply management system to be reformed. Harper has said that Canada is prepared to be ambitious and put all issues on the table, but in the same breath, for domestic political purposes, has stressed that Canada will defend its interests, including in individual sectors.

While the TPP remains very much a work in progress for Canada, another prong of what could be an Asian strategy has been stuck in limbo. Canada needs to reach out to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and re-establish the credibility that it once had with that organization. Recent developments in Burma provided an opportune moment to do just that, but after showing an interest in Burmese developments through a visit by Foreign Minister John Baird just prior to the recent by-elections, Canada stood by while other partners of ASEAN moved to announce suspension of sanctions. Only after the U.S., the U.K., Australia, Japan and the EU had announced their moves to relax sanctions did Canada make its move, on April 24. Canada missed the chance to move early and show leadership on the issue, but it was better to move now to join the international consensus than to continue to lag. Baird’s earlier visit was starting to look increasingly like a head fake, not a policy, but the recent move puts Canada back in the game by removing most sanctions, including those pertaining to exports, imports, financial services and investment.

If Canada is going to actually put in place an Asia-Pacific strategy, and there are some good policy reasons to suggest that this the moment to do so, then it will have to take a more holistic approach than just trying to sign up for trade agreements with as many Asian economies as possible. Energy economics and politics suggest that opening alternate markets across the Pacific for western Canadian bitumen and gas is a smart, if long-term move. It won’t be without its domestic challenges for Harper, given opposition to new pipelines and tankers from environmental and aboriginal groups, among others. But recent reforms to the environmental review process announced in Ottawa suggest that at the end of the day, the pipelines and tanker terminals will be built.

However, an Asia strategy will need more than trade agreements and tankers – it will also require a “whole of government” approach encompassing diplomacy, foreign aid, military commitment, immigration policy and cultural and educational exchanges and understanding.

The Asian team is waiting to see if Canada’s recent moves represent a pivot, with a real intention to change direction, or just another head fake. Only time will tell.

Hugh L. Stephens is Executive in Residence at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, in Vancouver, with 35 years of government and business experience in Asia. He is also principal of Trans-Pacific Connections (www.tpconnections.com).

Police Release Mexican Diplomat Accused Of Drunken Driving ...

File photo of police. (credit: Getty Images)

File photo of police. (credit: Getty Images)

ATLANTA (AP) — Police in an Atlanta suburb say they released a Mexican diplomat accused of drunken driving without holding him in jail after they learned of his government position.

Mariano Saynez Ruiz Duran had a blood-alcohol level of 0.126 and had been clocked at 91 mph on Georgia 400 early Friday morning, a Roswell police report states.

He was released after police learned that he’s a vice consular at the Mexican Consulate General’s Atlanta office, Roswell police Lt. James McGee said.

Officers confirmed he has partial immunity from law enforcement actions after calling the U.S. Department of State, according to the police report.

It wasn’t known whether the 39-year-old north Fulton County resident has an attorney, and a home phone number for him could not be located.

Duran’s wife drove him away, and police would not have allowed him to drive himself because of public safety concerns, McGee said.

The officers who released him were following protocol that’s followed when diplomats and others are stopped, McGee said.

The diplomat was given citations accusing him of drunken driving and speeding, Roswell police Officer Lisa Holland told WSB-TV, which first reported the case.

“It’s going to be up to higher authorities as to what they’re going to do about the charges,” McGee told The Associated Press early Wednesday. “It’s going to be up to them at this point what they want to work out.”

(© Copyright 2012 The Associated Press. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.)

Kyrgyzstan: Russian Diplomat Sheds More Light on Bilateral Spat ...

Economics, not politics is prompting Russia to get tough with Kyrgyzstan, a top Russian diplomat based in Bishkek tells EurasiaNet.org. At the same time, the diplomat blamed the Kyrgyz government for delays in a hydropower deal, asserting that officials in Bishkek were politicizing the issue.

Russian-Kyrgyz relations have hit some turbulence in recent months, with the Kremlin showing signs of obvious frustration with Kyrgyzstan’s efforts to obtain foreign aid from Moscow without offering much in the way of diplomatic loyalty in return. Amid rising tension, the two states are now haggling over terms of two large-scale strategic investments, one involving construction of a large hydropower facility on the Naryn River known as Kambarata-1, the other concerning at the Dastan torpedo factory.

Originally, Kambarata-1 was envisioned as a 1.9-gigawatt facility, but EurasiaNet.org has learned that Inter RAO, one of the prospective Russian backers of the project, is pushing to scale the facility’s annual generating capacity back to roughly 800-900 megawatts. In addition, Russia now wants to obtain 75 percent shares in both Kambarata and Dastan. Previously, Moscow was prepared to settle for less-than-majority shares in both ventures.

Kyrgyz leaders show no signs of giving in to what they believe to be Russian pressure tactics. Kyrgyz Prime Minister Omurbek Babanov stated in an interview with the Kommersant business daily on April 16 that Russia “is not fulfilling its obligations.”

The Russian stance is rooted mainly in fiscal realities, insisted Evgeny Terekhin, who serves as minister-counselor at the Russian Embassy in Bishkek.

“When everyone says ‘this big Russian bear is going to swallow small Kirgizia,’ it is not the full story,” Terekhin said. Both Kambarata and Dastan are intertwined with efforts to settle Kyrgyzstan’s debts to Russia. Part of the Kambarata deal, for example, involves a write-down of $180 million in Kyrgyz debt.

Terekhin asserted that Kyrgyz political leaders and local media are misrepresenting the terms of the Kambarata deal, which include a give-back of 25 percent of Russian owned shares to Kyrgyzstan once Kambarata-1 becomes profitable. Thus, ultimately Russia and Kyrgyzstan would end up with a 50-50 arrangement, he said.

“These negotiations have been going on for rather a long time. It’s a long story,” said Terekhin.

Uncertainty about the hydropower project’s profit point appears to be a significant factor in prompting Russian companies to want to scale back its scope. Energy insiders say the smaller version of the plant would be more economically viable and profitable over the long term. At the same time, insiders add that Kyrgyz officials are infatuated with the larger scale project, and are resisting Inter RAO’s new engineering proposals.

For Russia, the primary concern regarding Kambarata-1, along with another hydropower venture on the Naryn River, is limiting risk, the Russian diplomat stressed. “The position of our energy companies is simple. Both projects are rather expensive. One is estimated to be about $2 billion and the second between $4 billion and $5 billion,” Terekhin said. “The only investment by the Kyrgyz side would be represented by the water stream and river bank.”

“That is why they [Russian companies] ask for 75 percent [of Kambarata],” continued Terekhin. “But, as I have mentioned, this is not the full story. The full story is that they're asking for 75 percent of shares only for the period of repayment for this project. As soon as the expenditures are covered by the income from the sale of electric energy, the two parties return to 50-50 division of the shares.”

Terekhin suggested domestic political factors were limiting Kyrgyzstan’s negotiating flexibility. “It's not a secret to anybody that a wave of nationalism is rising up here [in Kyrgystan] and it would be difficult for anybody to withstand the pressure of this wave be it a president, or even the Lord himself,” Terekhin said.

“Everybody now is trying to play the role of the best patriot of his country, to be a better Catholic than the Pope,” he added. “I think that sooner or later this wave of emotion will go down and more calm and cold calculations will overcome. I think simply we - both parties - have to wait a little bit.”

Editor's note: 

Deirdre Tynan is a Bishkek-based reporter specializing in Central Asian affairs.

Tuesday, April 24, 2012

The Future is Now | Flashpoints - The Diplomat

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The U.S. isn’t “returning” to the Asia-Pacific, it never left in the first place. Here, in the world’s most strategically and economically dynamic region, China is already demonstrating great potential to undermine American strategic interests and the efficacy of the global sys­tem – and is doing so in practice. Though Beijing and Washington have considerable shared interests and potential for cooperation, the most difficult period for them to achieve “competitive coexistence” may already have begun. Assuming that high-intensity kinetic conflict can be avoided – fortunately, a highly likely prospect – China’s greatest challenge to U.S. interests and the global system might thus be the already unfolding strategic competition, friction, pres­suring, and occasional crises in the three “Near Seas” (the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas).

China is already a world-class military power – but not in the ways that many have charged. Beijing’s “blue water” naval expansion beyond the Second Island Chain, which isn’t proceeding at the highest level, does not pose a serious problem for Washington. Indeed, as a growing great power, it is only natural for China to develop an increasing pres­ence in this realm, and in many respects it should be welcomed.

The United States has and will continue to have many viable options to address any problems that might emerge in this area, at least with respect to a high intensity kinetic conflict. For instance, Chinese forces themselves are highly vulnerable to precisely the same types of “asymmetric” approaches (e.g., mis­sile attacks) that they can employ to great effect closer to China’s shores. In fact, there’s substantial room for cooperation beyond the Near Seas. This potential may even be said to be growing, as China’s overseas in­terests and capabilities increase, thereby allowing it to contribute in unprecedented ways. In this area, which covers the vast majority of the globe, Beijing appears to be cautiously open to Washington’s ideas about “defense of the global system” – which offer excellent opportunities for “free riding” off U.S.-led public goods provision.

The problem is that in the Near Seas themselves, and possibly beyond them over time, Beijing is work­ing to carve out a sphere of strategic influence with­in which freedom of navigation and other important international system-sustaining norms do not apply. Indeed, China already has some ability to engage in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) operations within the Near Seas/First Island Chain and their immediate approaches, assisted in part by the land-based Second Artillery Force; as well as longer-range precision strikes and global cyber activities. This A2/AD challenge threatens U.S. naval platforms, but is far more than just a Chinese navy-based threat.

The U.S. military has many options to prevent the People’s Liberation Army from paralyzing its forces, yet it will fail if it continues business as usual. It could already be difficult to handle kinetically with current American approaches, and the situation appears to be worsening rapidly. The U.S. may not have years to develop new countermeasures and prepare to address the most difficult aspects of the problem; in a sense, “the future is now.”

Andrew S. Erickson is an Associate Professor in the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College and a core founding member of the department’s China Maritime Studies Institute.This entry is based on remarks made at Harvard University during The Diplomat's Pivot to the Pacific panel.

Image credit: U.S. Navy

Taiwan's Pointless Toe Treading? | The Diplomat

The Republic of China maintains sweeping claims to the South China Sea. But is it needlessly alienating much-needed potential friends?

If only Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs could rack up allies as quickly as its scandals or neighbor alienating territorial claims.

A statement released by the ministry this month – the ninth such missive in the past 18 months – called for competing nations to respect the “Republic of China’s unwavering sovereignty over the South China Sea.”

The Republic of China – Taiwan’s official name since Chiang Kai-shek’s battered forces cemented control of the island following their civil war loss to Mao Zedong’s troops – claims about 3.5 million square kilometers  of the oil and gas-rich body of water based on “historical evidence” that Chinese fishermen once plied its waters and trade routes and desolate outcrops were established.

Taipei makes its claim under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which would be fine if it was a party to UNCLOS, or any other U.N. body or agreement. But the Republic of China was expelled from the United Nations in 1971, when the General Assembly recognized “the Peoples’ Republic of China as the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations.”

While Beijing’s oft-criticized “nine-dotted line” claim has been ridiculed by its Association of Southeast Asian Nation neighbors, Taiwan’s virtually identical declaration has been hammered as “frivolous” and “out of touch with Asia’s diplomatic reality.”

“I wish they would shut up. There isn’t a single Asian country that even recognizes them. How are they relevant?” asks one Southeast Asian diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “They lost their war 65 years ago and they still act like they are a great power. You would think show some humility where these frivolous claims are concerned. Discretion being the better part of valor, and all that.”

Critics of Taiwan’s handling of the situation say Taipei should duplicate its position on its other constitutionally enshrined and often bizarre Asian land claims – by ignoring them. 

Taiwan’s 1947 Constitution, written while Chiang Kai-sheik still had a Chinese capital, makes territorial land claims in all or part of 10 countries, including independent Mongolia, Tibet, and parts of India, Burma, Russia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. But those claims are never prosecuted by Taipei, and are only still enshrined in the Constitution because Beijing views any amendment to Taiwan’s territorial claims as a step towards independence and away from its “One China Policy.”

Both the U.S. and China are keen to retain the “status quo.” The U.S. State Department, in particular, is keen to maintain stability in the Taiwan Strait by minimizing moves by Taipei that the Middle Kingdom views as provocative.

“I don’t think they have a choice. If Taiwan starts walking away from elements in the Constitution, then it’s like pulling at a thread and where would it stop,” says Douglas Paal, a former director of the American Institute in Taiwan, which works as a de facto U.S. embassy in lieu of formal diplomatic ties with the island republic.

While walking away from Taiwan’s constitutional bind is one thing, observers say that Taipei’s pursuance of a claim it knows it can’t win at the expense of ruffling regional feathers  is quite another.  

“They are working with China on this because our claim backs up Beijing’s.  It’s this arrogance of a grand ultra-nationalist vision. But I would argue that if you want to use claims like this as potential bargaining chip in negotiations with China then there should be some credibility to them,” says Michael Kau, a former Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs under the independence leaning Democratic Progressive Party. “This idea of treating this huge body of water as ours by right of dubious historical claims, it’s not only not credible, it’s crazy.”

John Brown: U.S. Diplomat Peter Van Buren Speaks About ...

Exclusive Interview: U.S. Diplomat Peter Van Buren speaks about American Public Diplomacy


Public Diplomacy (PD) is a hard term to define. Some say it's just a euphemism for propaganda. The Department of State's definition is "engaging, informing, and influencing key international audiences." For some traditionally minded diplomats and commentators, the term "public diplomacy" is an oxymoron (true diplomacy, they argue, is practiced behind closed doors, not in public). How would you define PD?

Any communications strategy, from advertising to propaganda to social media to whatever you want to call it, plays second to reality -- actions really do speak louder than words. So as long as deaths in wedding parties from misplaced drone attacks, atrocities by soldiers and videos of Abu Ghraib exist, you are not going to fool anyone regardless of how many tweets you send out. In an age of increasingly prevalent media, the usual bullshit of the Secretary standing up in Geneva proclaiming support for human rights while people in their own countries see the U.S. overtly supporting nasty autocrats will dominate mind space. Here's a graphic (not my work) that illustrates the point.

Look at the outcome of the Haditha massacre in Iraq: 24 unarmed Iraqis were slaughtered by an out-of-control group of Marines in 2005, and now, seven years later, the case is finally concluded and no one is going to jail. You can Tweet and Facebook until the end of time, but that story will resonate for even longer within the Arab world.

The Haditha outcome also illustrates the point of relevancy. While most FSOs and almost all of the American public are probably ignorant about what happened in Haditha, the incident is well known among politically minded Iraqis. On the day when everyone there was talking about the guiltless conclusion, U.S. Embassy Baghdad PD was bleating happily about jazz and some art exhibit. The appearance -- to Iraqis -- was one of trying to change the topic, change the channel, to distract from the real issue of the day.

So whatever PD is, it can only be less effective than what the U.S. is actually doing.

Edward R. Murrow, the famed newsman and Director of the United States Information Agency during the Kennedy administration, is often quoted as saying that public diplomacy, as regards the formulation of policy, should be seriously taken into consideration at the take-off, not at the crash landing. More bluntly, you can't put lipstick on a pig. What is your view on the relationship between public diplomacy and policy?

See above.

As you know, the above-mentioned United States Information Agency (1953-1999), which handled public diplomacy during the Cold War, was consolidated into the State Department a few years after the collapse of Russian communism, thereby reflecting a historical pattern of the USG abolishing its "propaganda" (anti-propaganda?) agencies (e.g., the Committee on Public Information [1917-1919], the Office of War Information [1942-1945]) when a global conflict is over. Nostalgic USIA veterans tend to regret the dissolution of "their" independent agency, a relatively small organization (by Washington standards) giving its overseas officers considerable flexibility to act, on behalf of U.S. national interests, as they saw fit according general policy guidelines and local conditions (as an ex-USIA senior official told me over lunch not long ago, "we got away with murder"). Not amused by such declarations of independence (often unspoken), strait-laced State Department employees referred to USIA as "Useless," a play of words on USIA's overseas designation, USIS (United States Information Service). What's your take on PD now being, bureaucratically, a State function? Does it make PD more manageable and streamlined?

You can see the themes of relevancy and credibility running through this interview.

State Department output, what we say out loud, is characterized by caution above all else, a weird play on the Hippocratic Oath. But the "safest" things to say (we urge all sides to reconsider, Mistakes were made) have little value outside Foggy Bottom. A bit of vitality is needed, and PD lacks that now. In what foreign country do people routinely turn to a PD news source? Anything that flows into the State Department gets filtered out into the equivalent of "male pale and Yale," usually three days after the story has moved off the front pages. Safe, for sure, but also irrelevant. Often, irrelevant by choice if not by policy.

For example, to enflame my ulcer, I just flipped over to Twitter. Several Embassies are tweeting "Happy Earth Day" in unison, obviously a central command meme of the day from Washington. So what? Nothing wrong with Earth Day, but so what? Is the U.S. not still the world's predominant carbon fuels burner? What is the specific goal of sending Happy Earth Day tweets out in English to whomever?

Alec Ross, State's alleged social media king, tweets today, "97 years ago today, modern chemical weapons 1st used in war. German troops released chlorine gas on the front lines at Ypres, killing 5,000," with no link or explanation. I am not even sure what the point of that is, never mind how it might play into any of the national goals of the U.S.. Alec tweets out these odd "fun facts" regularly, to what point I do not know.

The lack of content, of vitality, also means that State only practices half of the social media equation. I see little evidence of interactivity, though people do try and break through the screen and ask visa questions, usually very specific to a person/case type questions because they cannot get them answered from inundated Consular sections. Posts crow over how many people watched or viewed something, but very rarely entertain true interactivity. I am sure they are afraid of it, afraid of saying anything that hasn't been cleared by several layers above them. That may be great for career security (the goal) but it does little to really put social media to use. Just the opposite, really.

The invasion and occupation of Iraq is considered by many a public-diplomacy disaster. Your own book on your one-year Foreign-Service experience (2009-2010) in that country has, as part of its title, "How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People." For those who have not had the opportunity to read your admirable volume, where/how did U.S. PD go so wrong in Iraq? Is it possible to say that America did, on occasion, do certain things right in its attempts to remake (in its own image) the cradle of civilization?

My experience with PD in Iraq was all propaganda all the time. PD's conception of PRT work was simply to over promote any small thing we did that wasn't a complete failure. If we dug a well, not necessarily a bad thing, the headline was "Bringing Water to Mesopotamia." Every PRT project had to include an interview with some Hollywood backlot Iraqi praising the United States, because as we know only White People can help the Brown Skinned of the world. PD didn't even try to balance or nuance a story; they wrote entirely for themselves and their bosses and Washington. People in Iraq certainly knew the truth, living it 24/7 in a world without water, electricity or sewers or schools, so who was PD trying to fool if not themselves? I wrote about this in more detail here and included a PD video piece so your readers can see for themselves what their tax dollars paid for.

The new social media, some argue, are redefining public diplomacy, with the buzzword "public diplomacy 2.0," coined during the Bush administration, still quite à la mode inside the beltway. Senior Advisor for Innovation to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton Alec Ross, according to a twitterer attending his recent talk at American University, stated that "I don't think of myself as a public diplomacy official. I think ... public diplomacy is more old-school American propaganda." In your view, how important/effective are the social media as a tool for the State Department to engage (a favorite word of the current administration) "key international audiences"?

To begin, you must have a goal -- sell soap, get people to switch from Coke to Pepsi, turn out to vote, stop joining al Qaeda, something you can use to know if you have succeeded and completed what you started out to do. Social media as practiced by the Department is amateur hour. A bunch of people led by the State Department's oldest living teenager Alec Ross think they understand media because they are banging away and getting weirdly excited by numbers. Success seems to be measured in how many followers an Ambassador has. Yet no one is interested in looking into the substance of social media. When I comment on interactive Embassy web pages or State Twitter accounts on my own blog at wemeantwell.com, what I see are desperate people trying to get a Visa question answered. They have no outlet to ask such questions because Consular sections are under siege, so they bombard social media. When I do see some questioners try and aim for more substantive topics, the replies from State are canned official language, statements that are "clearable" only because they are content-free or simply ape the party line.

So what is social media as practiced by State able to accomplish? You'd think given its emphasis and the money spent that someone would be interested in a Return on Investment study, a way to map out what was accomplished. But State does not work that way -- it is all about the "doing" and not about the "getting done." Social media as practiced is just another flim-flam, foisted on State this round by another short-timer political appointee whose connections to the Secretary mean he can do no wrong. Or, perhaps more honestly, no one has the guts to question his pronouncements. Anyone who has been at work in Foggy Bottom for more than a few years can recall similar flim-flams when faxes and email were going to reduce the need for overseas personnel (we can do it all from Washington!), or web home pages or video conferencing. All can be useful tools, but you have got to have a goal and you have got to measure your way toward that goal. Otherwise it is just flavor of the month stuff. Didn't we have virtual embassies for awhile in some 3-D online world game thing?

The USG-supported Broadcasting Board of Governors, which (according to its homepage) became "the independent entity responsible for all U.S. Government and government-sponsored, non-military, international broadcasting on October 1, 1999" (e.g., Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Sawa) and whose mission is "to inform, engage, and connect people around the world in support of freedom and democracy," is under considerable criticism these days for management failures and for intending to cut back on staff and programs. Based on your foreign-service experience of over two decades, what do you think is the reaction of overseas audiences to USG -supported broadcasting such as Voice of America? Are such broadcasts still necessary for U.S. national interests in an age when information is becoming more and more readily available? In a broader sense, can a journalist, in your view, be a true, objective master of her trade (and can her reports be trusted as reliable) if her paycheck comes from Uncle Sam (to cite Kim Andrew Elliott, a fast-media guru, "Journalism and public diplomacy are very different, indeed adversarial, endeavors").

Credibility is the key. If you look at the very successful penetrations of American society by foreign "public affairs," you see sources of news and entertainment that are clearly allied with a foreign entity (China Xinhua News, RT.com, al Jazeera, the BBC) and do not try to hide that fact. Yet, at the same time, they are aggressive in presenting a side of news that is missing in America's mainstream media, often pointing out the "other side" to a story or not shying away from reporting U.S. Government mistakes and misjudgments. Their credibility comes not from being pro-Russia, but from tapping into a need in the U.S. for alternative news sources.

People are too sophisticated now, even in the developing world, to be reached via crude propaganda -- America=Good, al Qaeda=Bad. That costs those sources their credibility and thus their audiences. Who cares what U.S. broadcasting into the Arab world has to say, or crap like Radio Marti? Most of the time it is just self-referential: Obama made a speech and PD says "Here's Obama's Speech" in case you missed it elsewhere or really want to plod through 1500 words on Earth Day. No one independently quotes their opinions, no one considers them vital or important the way al Jazeera became simply by filling a real gap in what people wanted to hear.

If the U.S. would try and learn a bit more about what people want, they might find a more ready audience. Instead, our "public diplomacy" programming seems designed more to please our bosses in Washington than to really reach people abroad.

Try it now -- go here and imagine yourself a young, politically charged Iraqi. What is on that page that demands your attention? The Cold War ended years ago and we are still talking about jazz.

The Smith-Mundt Act (1948), the legislation that provides the statutory basis for U.S. public diplomacy, prohibits the State Department from disseminating domestically USG information intended for overseas audiences. Do you think this firewall, in the Internet age, is anachronistic? Or is there something to be said about prohibiting the U.S. government from "propagandizing" the American people? Would you abolish/amend the Smith-Mundt Act (or, since so few Americans know anything about it, simply let it live on, untouched, in its obscurity, letting sleeping dogs lie)?

I think Smith-Mundt died on the vine already, whether it exists as a law still or not. Given both the ubiquity of the web and the fact that almost all of the U.S. public diplomacy spew is in English, I think we already know who the target audience is. For example, all the phony grief that gets expressed every time a new round of terrible atrocity photos emerge from Afghanistan certainly is not fooling the mothers of the dead Afghans; it is designed to make us feel better here at home. The Afghans know exactly what is happening in their homes and villages, even if the U.S. government can get away with calling each atrocity just another act of some bad apples. By the way, how many bad apples does it take before you have a whole pie full of them?

In the how-many-angels-can-dance-on-a-pin tradition, there is quite a lot of talk, among the PD community both outside and inside of academe, about how to measure the results of public diplomacy. Do you think that there is a scientific way to gauge the impact of PD, both short-term and long-term? Or is the practice of public diplomacy, in the words of scholar Frank Ninkovich, essentially "an act of faith" that, in its often-flawed attempts to make our small planet a better world through greater international understanding, cannot be reduced, in well-intentioned efforts to evaluate it, to statistics on a chart or an executive summary on yet another think-tank report?

The old saying, any road will get you there if you don't know where you're going, applies here. If I was allowed back into the building and to ask a question of someone important in Public Affairs, I'd ask this: why isn't your whole "PD" strategy built around sending out messages in bottles dropped into the ocean? Now of course the analogy only goes so far, but just as the message in the bottle strategy can be dismissed with a quick thought experiment (who knows who reads what, and what they do after the read it), can anyone really make a different claim for the State Department's current efforts?

Metrics start with a clear goal, an end state to use the military term, and work backwards from there. One of the core problems with the State Department, and the one that most significantly contributes to the Department's increasing irrelevance in foreign policy, is that State seems just content to "be," to create conditions of its own continued existence. So, if social media is a new cool thing, and Congress will pay for it, then social media it is. What if instead the organization had more concrete goals? Then we could measure back from them. I'll not trouble readers with my own list of foreign policy goals, but if the best you can come up with is something so broad as "engage the public" then you are pretty close to having no real goal at all. Best to throw notes into the ocean and hope for the best.

Bonus: One cheap and easy way for a non-thinker to dismiss these points is to say "Well, sure, it is easy to ask the questions, but where are Van Buren's answers? If he wants metrics, what does he propose?"

Of course that is a silly line of reasoning. Change begins with the questions, the point of asking is to stimulate the search for answers and solutions. It would be easier if all the solutions to all of the PD problems could be laid out in a short interview, but life ain't that way cowboys. Don't dismiss important questions for lack of easy answers. Instead, realize there are higher goals than obedience and career climbing and at least allow room for the Questions and admit the need to look for Answers.

As a starting point, perhaps consider this: When you get a machine that is so immense and so bureaucratic and so career promotion oriented, the mission will be lost and truth and honesty are mere bystanders eventually wrecking any positive mission. The whole concept of institutions and how they are managed and sized needs to be examined big time. The solution, if there is any, is breaking it down into small autonomous offices or missions or programs that link together but are managed separately eliminating an immense hierarchy.

Follow John Brown on Twitter: www.twitter.com/ivante

Tehran Recalls Diplomat Accused Of Groping Girls In Brazil ...

Iran has summoned home Hekmatollah Ghorbani, its third-ranking diplomat in Brazil, after allegations that he fondled underage girls in a swimming pool at a sports club, AFP reports.

Ramin Mehmanparast, a spokesman for Iran’s Foreign Ministry, told reporters Tuesday that the diplomat “will be dealt with according to the foreign ministry’s disciplinary rules.”

According to AFP, the Brazilian media has reported that Ghorbani is accused of groping at least four girls between the ages of nine and 15 in the incident, which occurred in mid-April.

“People wanted to kill him,” a father of one of the girls told the new website G1.

Brazilian police arrested Ghorbani but he was released under diplomatic immunity. The Iranian embassy in Brasilia defended Ghorbani in a statement calling the incident a “cultural misunderstanding,” a comment which Mehmanparast was asked about Tuesday.

“On principle, we do not accept this person being at a mixed-sex swimming pool, and it is considered a disciplinary violation and therefore he was summoned home at once and we are reviewing his case,” Mehmanparast replied.

Mehmanparast also said the incident was being twisted by some Western and Arab media “for political gain” against Iran.

(h/t GlobalPost)

Image from Shutterstock

Brazil, Iran

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