Ahead of the upcoming nuclear talks between the P5+1 and Iran, InsideIran’s Reza Akbari conducted an interview with Hossein Alizadeh, the former Iranian charge d’affaires at the Iranian embassy in Finland. He resigned after the contested 2009 presidential election.
Q: The P5+1 and Iran have agreed to talks April 13 in Istanbul in order to end the current crisis. Given your experience as a former Iranian diplomat, what do you think Iran plans to do in the talks? Do you think Iran plans to make concessions, such as suspending enrichment for a certain period, which is one of the demands of some states participating in the talks?
A: I believe the Iranian government will choose a conciliatory path during the upcoming negotiations. The government does not want the outcome of the talks to result in a win-lose situation, with the West as the winner of the talks. Logically, we can see that Iran is paying a heavy price for its nuclear program. These pressures include heavy international pressures, crippling sanctions, and further international isolation. At this point rationality should mandate the Islamic Republic to choose a different path.
I believe we should remember the conditions under which Iran accepted United Nations Security Council Resolution 598. Iranian diplomatic circles were adamant about publically rejecting the possibility of accepting the ceasefire resolution. However, due to secret diplomatic efforts, Iran signed the agreement, which was a shocking revelation when it was announced by the media. Khomeini of course referred to it as drinking a “poison chalice.”
Despite Iran’s adamant claims about enriching uranium and continuing the nuclear program, I imagine Iran’s covert diplomatic efforts contain a level of rationality. They have to at least create a possibility for making concessions since for the time being Iran is facing a win-lose situation. Iran is at the losing end of the bargain. The specific tactics for making concessions will become partially apparent during the negotiation process. The other side of Iran’s strategy is focused on covert diplomacy that we have no information about.
Q: What can the U.S. and the EU do ahead of these talks to encourage a successful outcome? Some policy makers have suggested a direct statement should be made that the U.S. and EU do not seek regime change in Iran. Would this type of message encourage Iran to compromise on the nuclear program?
Until today no official statement from any western government has claimed the goal to be the overthrow of the regime. It is not necessary to deny any attempts of changing the Islamic regime when no such position has ever been taken. This option has not even been put on the table for them to now say it is off the table.
However, if we are looking for other motivational factors we can focus on economic incentives. But, some economic offers were made to Iran during previous years, which Iran did not accept and chose the enrichment path instead. So, offering the same incentives is a tested method and trying it again is senseless. I also don’t believe the upcoming U.S. presidential election would allow the Obama administration, as the most important western country opposing Iran’s nuclear program, to pursue an incentive-based approach to negotiations. Even minor talk of offering the Iranians incentives will be an excuse for his republican opponents to attack him. They will accuse Obama of reverting back to his policy of diplomacy with Iran, which he attempted over three years ago.
Therefore, Obama will not open the door of incentives during the upcoming negotiations. In order to disarm the republicans, Obama will actually increase the pressures on the Islamic Republic. For example, currently there is a discussion about preventing companies from insuring Iranian ships. There are talks about closer monitoring and searching of Iranian shipments and many other various pressures that could increase. Such pressures are more likely to shape the diplomatic environment prior to the nuclear talks rather than possible incentives.
Q: U.S. Secretary of State Clinton was quoted as saying the talks are “the last chance” for Iran. Does Iran’s government, particularly Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, take such ominous warnings seriously? Or, are such statements counterproductive and provocative?
In my opinion the Iranian Supreme Leader is taking such warnings seriously. My reason behind this statement is his speech delivered in Mashahd on March 21, which coincided with the second day of the Persian New Year. Khamenei harshly stated that Iran will retaliate against any attack “on the same level.” This means the Islamic Republic has prepared itself for any type of pressures. When Iran chose the enrichment path, it knew what it will have to face. So, there is no reason for them to take the statements by Hillary Clinton or Obama’s recent remarks in Seoul lightly.
Therefore, if there is some kind of secret diplomatic effort the equation as we know it changes. The Islamic Republic will approach such talks with a win-win approach and will resolve the disputes. However, if such diplomatic efforts bear no fruit or hidden diplomatic talks don’t even exist, then statements by U.S. officials mean that the circle of pressure around Iran will get tighter.
During the past year we saw how the pressures kept escalating, namely the sanctioning of Iran’s Central Bank and boycotting Iran’s oil exports. So, such threats are viewed as real dangers by the Iranian government and not just potential warnings. We have to wait and see to what degree Iran is ready to tolerate these pressures. For example, North Korea has endured many harsh sanctions, but has not budged from its position. According to some reports, even if these sanctions cause the North Korean people to eat grass the government would be willing to move forward with its program.
The Iranian government has greatly oppressed the voices of domestic critics and has so far tolerated a great level of international economic pressure. The pressures have so far impacted the people and not the regime. This is not even a bit worrisome for the Islamic Republic. They will protect themselves well and it won’t be an issue if the people have to suffer like the North Koreans. It was the same situation in Iraq.
Q: How would you compare today to 2003 when Iran suspended enrichment? Do you see any similarities in the political environment that would lead Iran to take the same action?
Yes. The Iranian regime has always claimed that they gave up enrichment, but then they did not have any leverage for negotiations. I strongly believe that the Iranian regime has either started secret talks or it intends to do so shortly. By having its nuclear file as leverage, Iran can potentially receive some concessions from the west. For example, they can ask for the country’s human rights file to be ignored or receive some economic incentives, such as restoring some economic ties.
So, logically it is possible for them to decide to return to 2003 conditions. Perhaps, this long and hazardous road is being taken by the Iranian government so when the final round of negotiations take place, whenever that maybe, the regime will have a great amount of leverage for getting a better deal.
Q: Some analysts argue that following the clear victory by the Supreme Leader’s faction in the recent parliamentary elections there is now little danger that threatens Khamenei’s dominance. This might be a good opportunity for the west to approach Iran for nuclear talks. Do you believe in this point of view?
I strongly believe that the Supreme Leader is a lot more concerned about the domestic threats than foreign threats. I believe the Iranian regime has prepared itself to the best of its abilities for a foreign attack. So, they have, to a certain extent, built immunity toward these threats. They are able to defend themselves and they are able to retaliate in kind. But, what causes Khamenei to lose sleep is the domestic opposition.
In a potential war with the west if an enemy is killed, the Leader will say an invader was executed. But, how is he going to justify the killing of domestic protesters, who are just asking for their votes or lower food prices?
The Supreme Leader has so far been unable to create a unified line of support. Just look at the amount of disagreement between the supporters of Khamenei. There are disagreements between Ahmadinejad and the parliament. There are disagreements between Ahmadinejad and the Judiciary. They are disagreements between Ahmadinejad and Hashemi Rafsanjani. There are disagreements between Hashemi Rafsanjani and Khamenei, and so many other examples. These examples all indicate that there is a great level of disunity in the government, which is a cause of great concern.
